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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, United States Customs officers seized shipments of 
hoasca, tea-like leaves containing a hallucinogen listed as a Schedule I 
controlled substance.
1
  The shipment was bound for an O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (“UDV”) compound in New Mexico, 
where the small Brazilian-based Christian Spiritist sect would drink the 
tea during religious ceremonies.
2
  The UDV sued after the government 
investigated and threatened prosecution, claiming the hoasca ban 
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).3 
A procedural aspect of the case, not raised by the parties or the 
court, raises important Establishment Clause questions.
4
  The district 
court enjoined the government from enforcing the Controlled Substances 
Act
5
 against the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca.6  But the judge 
attached conditions to the preliminary injunction that gave the 
government broad power to regulate the group, its members, and its 
religious ceremonies.
7
  The injunction directed the UDV “to import the 
tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control over the tea to persons 
of church authority, and to warn particularly susceptible UDV members 
of the dangers of hoasca.”8  Further, it “required that the church, upon 
demand by the [Drug Enforcement Administration] identify its members 
who handle hoasca outside of ceremonies, allow for on-site inspections 
and inventories, provide samples, identify times and locations of 
ceremonies, and designate a liason to the DEA.”9 
Scholars suggest the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence means “[g]overnment must keep out of internal problems 
of religious bodies when those problems concern religious 
 
 1. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 425. 
 3. Id. at 425-26.  The Supreme Court struck down RFRA because Congress exceeded the 
scope of its power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and contradicted 
“vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”  City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).  However, RFRA remains applicable in actions against 
the federal government.  See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the 
Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187, 201 n.57 (2001) (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. 
Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. 
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 4. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 209 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (2004). 
 6. Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. at 427. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 209. 
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understandings.”10  Courts will generally strike down government 
programs resulting in “excessive entanglement” with religion under 
Lemon v. Kurtzman
11
 and its progeny.
12
  This Article argues that the 
Uniao do Vegetal injunction amounted to unconstitutional entanglement 
because it permitted government inspection of UDV facilities to monitor 
sectarian hoasca use.
13
  In free speech cases, courts almost always refuse 
to restrict expression prior to a determination that it is protected.
14
  This 
Article further argues, in light of history and the Court’s current attitude 
toward religion, that same principle should apply in cases implicating 
the Religion Clauses. 
Part II of this Article discusses the Lemon test and several post-
Lemon decisions applying the “entanglement” prong.  Part II then argues 
that the preliminary injunction issued in Uniao do Vegetal improperly 
entangled the government with religious activities under Lemon.  Part III 
describes the Court’s “prior restraint” doctrine, which bars judges from 
preliminarily enjoining speech except in rare cases, and examines 
historical, doctrinal, and pragmatic links between the Free Speech 
Clause and the Religion Clauses.  Finally, Part IV argues these links 
between the First Amendment Clauses justify applying prior restraint 
principles when considering whether to enjoin potentially protected 
religious activity. 
II.  THE LEMON TEST APPLIED TO INJUNCTIONS THAT GIVE THE 
GOVERNMENT SUBSTANTIAL REGULATORY POWER OVER RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICE 
This Part explains the Court’s holding in Lemon v. Kurtzman,15 
focusing particularly on the “excessive entanglement” prong of the test, 
and outlines several post-Lemon applications of the doctrine.  The 
second section concludes that, because the conditions attached to the 
 
 10. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious 
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998).  
 11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 12. Id. at 624-25. 
 13. Uniao de Vegetal is important for determining the scope of the “compelling interest” test 
in Free Exercise litigation and determining when an exemption is required under RFRA’s higher 
standard of scrutiny.  See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 207-10.  However, that aspect of the 
case is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 14. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1984) (“If one constant exists in Supreme Court first amendment 
theory, it is that ‘[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to . . . [the] Court with a ‘heavy 
presumption’ against its constitutional validity.’”). 
 15. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. 
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Uniao do Vegetal injunction required substantial government oversight 
and inquiry into UDV’s beliefs and practices, it amounted to 
unconstitutional entanglement. 
A. The Lemon Test and “Excessive Entanglement” 
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
The Lemon Court invalidated two state laws reimbursing private 
elementary and secondary schools, some affiliated with religious 
denominations, for expenses related to “specified secular subjects.”16  
Some state dollars paid for secular school books and supplies, while a 
portion subsidized teacher salaries.
17
  Considering the first and second 
prongs of the test, the Court held that the statutes advanced the secular 
purpose of enhancing educational quality.
18
  But the Court’s analysis 
centered on “excessive entanglement” between the state and religious 
institutions. 
The Court began by stating that “total separation” between church 
and state is impossible.
19
  For example, states may inspect religious 
schools for fire code violations or compliance with compulsory 
attendance laws.
20
  After engaging in a searching, fact-intensive inquiry, 
the Court concluded that the funding schemes were unconstitutional 
because they excessively entangled state dollars with religious 
education.
21
  Specifically, the state programs subsidized religious 
educators teaching secular subjects, creating the danger that teachers 
might, even in good faith, inculcate religion with the help of state 
dollars.
22
  The states placed restrictions to make sure state money did not 
support religious proselytizing.
23
  However, to ensure compliance with 
those restrictions, the Court found the state would have to employ 
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing surveillance.”24  This, 
 
 16. Id. at 606-07. 
 17. Id. at 607. 
 18. Id. at 613.  The first prong of the Lemon test requires courts to evaluate whether 
government action has a “secular purpose.”  The second prong states that government action must 
not have the “primary effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion. 
 19. Id. at 614. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 625. 
 22. Id. at 619. 
 23. Id. at 618. 
 24. Id. at 619. 
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the Court held, amounted to excessive entanglement in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.
25
 
2. Post-Lemon Case Law Applying the “Excessive Entanglement” 
Prong 
Lemon established the general rule that government entangles itself 
with religion when it intrudes into, participates in, or supervises religious 
affairs.
26
  Several post-Lemon cases provide more precise guidance.  In 
the following cases, the Supreme Court found the state programs aiding 
religious institutions did not foster excessive entanglement with religion.  
Contrasting these holdings helps analyze entanglement issues raised by 
the Uniao do Vegetal preliminary injunction.
27
 
In Tilton v. Richardson,
28
 announced the same day as Lemon, a 
federal program
29
 awarded construction grants to institutions of higher 
learning, some affiliated with religious groups, on the condition that 
schools used the funds only for secular purposes.
30
  Plaintiffs sued the 
federal grant administrator, along with four religious colleges that 
received federal money to build libraries, a performing arts center, a 
science building, and a language laboratory.
31
  After finding the federal 
statute reflected a secular legislative purpose and was not enacted 
primarily to advance or inhibit religion, the Court turned to the question 
of whether the grant program fostered excessive entanglement between 
religion and government.
32
 
The Court distinguished Lemon.  First, entanglement was not a 
great concern because, unlike elementary and secondary religious 
schools, the mission of religious higher education is not indoctrination.
33
  
Second, the Court found “the nonideological character of the aid that the 
Government provides” diminished entanglement concerns.34  In Lemon, 
the state statutes funded teachers’ salaries directly.35  In Tilton, the grants 
simply subsidized secular facilities.
36
  Finally, the Court found that 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONST. LAW § 441 (2011). 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
 29. Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-21 (2004). 
 30. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674-75. 
 31. Id. at 676. 
 32. Id. at 678-84. 
 33. Id. at 685-86. 
 34. Id. at 688-89. 
 35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971). 
 36. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687. 
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because the grant was merely a “one-time” award for a specified purpose 
(unlike the “continuing payments” in Lemon) the funding scheme did not 
constitute entanglement.
37
 
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works,
38
 Maryland enacted a law 
“provid[ing] for annual non-categorical grants to private colleges, 
among them religiously affiliated institutions, subject only to the 
restrictions that the funds not be used for ‘sectarian purposes.’”39  To 
enforce the ban on “sectarian purposes,” a state agency determined 
eligibility by asking whether the college or university awarded 
“primarily theological or seminary degrees.”40  If so, the institution was 
disqualified.
41
  If not, the agency required eligible colleges or 
universities to submit an affidavit affirming that state money would not 
fund religious purposes.
42
  The state also directed the institution to 
segregate funds and document that state money was not used to further 
sectarian activities.
43
  A group of Maryland citizens sued the state and 
several religious institutions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
under the Establishment Clause.
44
 
The parties did not contest the first prong of the Lemon test, and the 
Court held that the statute was not enacted to advance or inhibit 
religion.
45
  Turning to entanglement, the Court found that the statute was 
distinguishable from Tilton “only by form of aid.”46  The appropriations 
in Roemer were annual, while in Tilton they were one-time payments.
47
  
But the annual nature of the grants was not dispositive.
48
  While 
certainly a consideration, the Court gave great weight to the “character 
of the aided institutions.”49  Because the Maryland institutions served 
higher education purposes, as in Tilton, and because the institutions were 
capable of separating secular and sectarian uses, the statute did not foster 
excessive entanglement.
50
 
 
 37. Id. at 688-89. 
 38. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
 39. Id. at 739. 
 40. Id. at 741-42. 
 41. Id. at 742. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 744. 
 45. Id. at 754-60. 
 46. Id. at 764. 
 47. Id. at 764-66. 
 48. Id. at 766. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 766-67. 
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As these cases suggest, entanglement turns heavily on the 
government’s method of policing the boundaries between church and 
state.  As Roemer puts it, whether the Court finds excessive 
entanglement depends on “the ability of the State to identify and 
subsidize separate secular functions carried out at the school, without on-
the-site inspections being necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to 
sectarian purposes.”51  In Lemon, the state funding scheme essentially 
required government officials to intrude into the classroom to ensure 
teachers did not inculcate students in secular subjects.  The schemes in 
Tilton and Roemer required no such method.  
3. Post-Entanglement Case Law: A New Approach 
The Lemon “entanglement” prong has been roundly criticized,52 
and its current status as constitutional doctrine is unclear.
53
  The 
Supreme Court in Agostini v. Felton
54
 suggested that the “excessive 
entanglement” prong may not be a distinct test, but rather a factor under 
the “principal effects” prong.55  Further, the Court seems to have moved 
toward analyzing Establishment Clause issues under Justice O’Connor’s 
“endorsement” test.56  In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, holding that 
Christian and Jewish holiday displays on public property amounted to 
unconstitutional establishment, the Court understood the Establishment 
Clause to mean the government “may not involve itself too deeply in 
such an institution’s affairs.”57  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence stated 
the government establishes religion whenever it “endorses or 
 
 51. Id. at 765 (emphasis added). 
 52. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1393-94 
(1981) (arguing that the “entanglement” test does not fully encompass all relevant aspects of 
religious freedom, including a general “right to church autonomy.”); Mark E. Chopko, Religious 
Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645 (1992) 
(arguing that the entanglement prong creates a Catch-22); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of limiting the entanglement inquiry 
institutional entanglement); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice White, who argued in his Lemon dissent that entanglement creates 
a paradox); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429-30 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the entanglement prong resulted in “anomalous” decisions). 
 53. Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to 
Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 544 n.242 (2005). 
 54. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 55. Id. at 232. 
 56. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625-26 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 57. Id. at 591 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1971). 
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disapproves of” religion.58  “Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community . . . . Disapproval 
of religion conveys the opposite message.”59  The injunction in Uniao do 
Vegetal sent the message that the UDV’s religious beliefs were 
disfavored and that the group was considered by the court to be outside 
the mainstream.  Under either test, it seems clear that the Court is willing 
to strike down laws either requiring comprehensive state surveillance of 
religious practice or expressing “disapproval” of a particular religion. 
B. Lemon Applied to the Preliminary Injunction Granted in Uniao do 
Vegetal 
1. The District Court’s Rationale for Imposing the Preliminary 
Injunction 
The UDV moved to preliminarily enjoin the government from 
enforcing the Controlled Substances Act against it, based on the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, principles of international law, the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment, and the RFRA.
60
  The district court rejected all but 
the last argument.
61
 
Under RFRA, the government may substantially burden a person’s 
religious exercise only if it demonstrates that the burden (1) furthers a 
compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling interest.
62
  The government asserted 
“compelling” interests in complying with a treaty, preventing health and 
safety risks, and preventing diversion of hoasca to non-religious use.
63
  
The Government conceded that the UDV was sincere in their beliefs and 
enforcing the drug laws against the UDV substantially burdened the 
religious group.
64
 
 
 58. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 59. Id. at 625. 
 60. O Centra Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 
1239-40 (D.N.M. 2002). 
 61. Id. at 1241-55. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2004). 
 63. Uniao do Vegetal, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53. 
 64. Id. at 1253. 
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The court first noted that hoasca differed substantially from other 
drugs.
65
  Many courts held that regulating marijuana is a compelling 
governmental interest, while hoasca occupied no such status.
66
  The 
district court then evaluated the government’s asserted interests in health 
and safety.  The court stated that “hoasca tea plays a central role in the 
practice of the UDV religion . . . [and] UDV members drink hoasca only 
during regular religious services, held on the first and third Saturdays of 
every month and on ten annual holidays.”67  Research regarding 
hoasca’s health effects was sparse.68  The UDV claimed the evidence 
was insufficient to conclude religious use of hoasca endangered the 
health and safety of its members.
69
  The government argued that the 
evidence showed the drug was dangerous.
70
  After considering expert 
testimony, the district court found the government failed to meet its 
heavy burden because the evidence was “in equipoise.”71 
The court next considered the government’s interest in preventing 
hoasca’s diversion to the non-religious market.  Government experts 
testified that hoasca might be diverted to non-religious use because an 
illicit market for the drug existed, the drug received publicity, and 
diverting the drug took little cost.
72
  UDV experts emphasized the 
“thinness of the market” for hoasca, the small number of doses UDV 
members imported, and the UDV’s strong incentive to prevent diversion 
because hoasca was sacramental.
73
  The district court again sided with 
UDV.
74
 
Because the government could not demonstrate a compelling state 
interest, the court did not reach “least restrictive means” analysis.75  
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1254. 
 67. Id. at 1255. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1256. 
 71. Id. at 1262. 
 72. Id. at 1262-64. 
 73. Id. at 1264-66. 
 74. Id. at 1266.  The district court then went on to discuss the government’s interest in 
complying with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances and found the 
treaty did not extend to hoasca.  Id. at 1266-69. 
 75. Id. at 1269. 
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2. Does the Preliminary Injunction Foster Excessive 
Entanglement? 
Against this backdrop, the court preliminarily enjoined the 
government from enforcing the drug law against the UDV.
76
  But the 
injunction required the UDV “to import the tea pursuant to federal 
permits, to restrict control over the tea to persons of church authority, 
and to warn particularly susceptible UDV members of the dangers of 
hoasca,”77  and allowed the DEA to inspect, take inventory of hoasca, 
and test the drug on site.
78
  The UDV was also required to designate a 
liaison to the DEA and to allow government officials access to its 
ceremonies.
79
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stayed the 
preliminary injunction because the UDV “should have demonstrated to 
the district court that the right to relief was ‘clear and unequivocal.’”80  
First, the district court’s conclusion that an international treaty did not 
extend to hoasca was questionable.
81
  Second, the lower court erred by 
finding the government’s interest in health and safety was not 
compelling.
82
  The district court failed to give adequate weight to 
Congress’ findings that any Schedule I narcotic has high potential for 
abuse, no accepted medical use, and is unsafe.
83
  The Tenth Circuit also 
noted that courts are generally unwilling to recognize religious 
exceptions.
84
  Finally, the court stated the jurisprudence before the 
Employment Division v. Smith
85
 decision disfavored “religious 
accommodations requiring ‘burdensome and constant official 
supervision and management.’”86 
The Tenth Circuit did not engage in, and the parties did not raise 
the possibility of, entanglement analysis.
87
  The order addressed only 
one side of the First Amendment coin—that Free Exercise disfavors 
 
 76. Id. at 1270. 
 77. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427 (2006). 
 78.  MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 209. 
 79. Id. 
 80. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 466 (10th 
Cir. 2002). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 467. 
 85. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 86. Uniao do Vegetal, 314 F.3d at 467 (emphasis added). 
 87. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 
2004) (en banc). 
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accommodations requiring substantial state oversight.  However, the 
other side of that coin may require courts to strike conditions imposing 
substantial government oversight on religious activity from preliminary 
injunctions because the Establishment Clause disfavors the very same 
thing. 
A finding that government oversight imposed on the UDV by the 
district court’s preliminary injunction fosters excessive entanglement is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  The preliminary injunction permitted the government to 
use burdensome surveillance of the UDV’s ceremonies and facilities to 
regulate secular problems associated with hoasca: health and safety and 
diversion of the drug to recreational users.  To do so, however, 
government officials were necessarily required to examine, evaluate, and 
ultimately decide whether the religious use of hoasca, receiving it as 
communion in religious ceremonies, was legitimate.  Under Lemon and 
its progeny, the court’s arrangement fosters excessive entanglement.  
The preliminary injunction is much closer to the statutes invalidated in 
Lemon than those upheld in Tilton and Roemer.  At least three judicially 
imposed conditions raise Establishment Clause concerns. 
The first two problematic conditions are related.  The district court 
required the UDV to provide DEA agents with names, addresses, and 
Social Security numbers of members who handled hoasca outside 
ceremonies, to keep the DEA informed about the times and locations of 
its ceremonies, and allow on-site inspections of hoasca shipments.
88
  
The rationale is secular: preventing diversion to the nonreligious market.  
In operation, though, the conditions required DEA agents to police the 
boundaries between religion and state.  The government had to ask why 
and for what purposes members handled the drug outside ceremonies.
89
  
The inquiry required a detailed evaluation of the UDV’s religious 
practice and the basic tenets of its faith.  For example, perhaps UDV 
ministers blessed hoasca before ceremonies.  Or maybe UDV ministers 
prepared the tea outside the ceremonial context.  DEA agents were 
forced to examine these practices and determine whether the religious 
practice was legitimate.  Further, the DEA was allowed on-site to ensure 
UDV members properly safeguarded hoasca from diversion to the illicit 
market.  This condition operated similarly to the statute struck down in 
Lemon.  Just as the state would need to employ “comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing surveillance” to make sure teachers 
 
 88. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 209.  
 89. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
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stayed on the secular side of the line,
90
 DEA agents would be present at 
solemn religious events and inquire into the religious beliefs and 
practices of the UDV to ensure the drug did not divert to the market. 
A third problematic condition required UDV church officials to 
warn “susceptible” UDV members of the potentially harmful effects of 
hoasca.
91
  Again, the rationale was secular:  protecting the health and 
safety of UDV members.  But again, entanglement problems loomed.  
The court’s condition required the government to evaluate and monitor 
the content of the warning that UDV officials gave “susceptible” 
members.
92
  In Lemon, the Court observed that teachers may, even in 
good faith, convey a religious message even if the academic subject is 
purely secular.
93
  UDV officials, even in good faith, may have related a 
religious message by explaining the dangers of hoasca to UDV 
members.  DEA officials, then, were required not only to identify the 
“susceptible” members of the UDV, but to monitor the warning to 
ensure it contained no religious message.
94
 
In short, assume Congress determined the UDV was entitled to a 
religious exemption for hoasca use.  Further, assume Congress included 
these three conditions in legislation exempting UDV from the Controlled 
Substances Act.  Supreme Court case law strongly suggests that because 
the conditions require on-site inspections to prevent secular purposes 
from being entangled with religious purposes,
95
 the legislation violates 
the Establishment Clause. 
Even if the Court applied Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test, 
the injunction issued in Uniao do Vegetal sends a clear message to 
adherents of the faith that “they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community.”96  The injunction “disapproves” of the religion, 
and the trial court should not have been so quick to send the message 
that its practice needed such searching oversight.  The next question is 
what source courts should use to decide whether to issue preliminary 
injunctions in cases implicating the Establishment Clause. 
 
 90. Id. at 619. 
 91. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427 (2006). 
 92. Id. at 421. 
 93. Lemon, 403 U.S. 619. 
 94. Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. at 421. 
 95. Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976). 
 96. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
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III.  PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND INJUNCTIONS: A USEFUL FIRST 
AMENDMENT ANALOGUE 
This Part first outlines the Supreme Court’s prior restraint doctrine, 
with specific focus on court-issued injunctions.  Second, this Part 
surveys the historical arguments and the Court’s current debate 
surrounding the Religion Clauses and their interaction with the Free 
Speech Clause.  Finally, this Part establishes a link between freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion and argues that this link justifies treating 
the two similarly when judges consider restraining religious practice 
prior to a full determination that the practice is unconstitutional. 
A. Prior Restraint Doctrine 
Prior restraints against speech are especially disfavored.
97
  A typical 
example is a regulation requiring individuals to obtain licenses from 
government officials before speaking or distributing information.
98
  But 
courts have also struck down as unconstitutional prior restraints and 
preliminary injunctions suppressing alleged libel
99
 and even sensitive 
military information.
100
  The fundamental problem created by 
preliminary injunctions in speech cases “is that communication will be 
suppressed . . . before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by 
the First Amendment.”101 
Of course, a permanent injunction after a full determination that 
speech falls outside the scope of the First Amendment is appropriate.
102
  
However, judicial standards governing preliminary injunctions give 
courts authority to impose injunctions where they find “a substantial 
likelihood of success by the plaintiff.”103  Combined with the collateral 
bar rule, which sanctions violations of court-ordered injunctions by 
contempt, preliminary injunctions against speech put a speaker in a 
bind.
104
  When a district court preliminarily enjoins speech, “even when 
 
 97. Redish, supra note 14, at 57. 
 98. See id. 
 99. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 100. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 101. Pittsburgh Pr. Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). 
 102. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J 147, 170 (1998). 
 103. Id. at 164. 
 104. The collateral bar rule indeed makes prior restraints especially problematic as a structural 
matter.  It poses a trilemma for the speaker—either obey the injunction and forego one’s speech; 
appeal and risk losing valuable time, especially if the speech is time sensitive; or disobey the 
injunction, speak, and risk a contempt prosecution where one will be stripped of the First 
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the injunction is entered for the seemingly laudable purpose of 
preserving the status quo pending the final determination of whether the 
speech is protected,” it is nevertheless considered a prior restraint.105 
The principle case governing prior restraints is Near v. 
Minnesota.
106
  In Near, a Minnesota statute authorized local officials to 
obtain an injunction against newspaper publishers accused of defamatory 
speech.
107
  The statute required the publisher to prove the material at 
issue was not only true, but published with “good motives” and for 
“justifiable ends.”108  If the publisher failed to prove these elements, the 
court was authorized to temporarily or permanently enjoin the 
newspaper from printing the material.
109
  The Court struck down the 
Minnesota statute because it constituted “the essence of censorship.”110  
However, the Court did not opt for a categorical ban against injunctions 
that restrain speech.  The strong presumption against prior restraints 
yields when speech implicates national security, obscenity, or 
incitements to violence.
111
 
While the Court has not marked the precise bounds of its prior 
restraint doctrine, Professor Redish argues that a preliminary injunction 
against speech might withstand constitutional scrutiny if “a strong 
likelihood exists that the government will be able to establish that the 
challenged expression is” not protected by the First Amendment.112  This 
view has not gone unchallenged, and Redish himself acknowledged 
problems with this approach.
113
  Professors Lemley and Volokh suggest 
that preliminary injunctions restricting speech may be permissible if they 
 
Amendment defense.  Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore?, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1661 (2005). 
 105. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 102, at 171-72. 
 106. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 107. Id. at 701-02. 
 108. Id. at 702. 
 109. Id. at 703. 
 110. Id. at 713. 
 111.  
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its 
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and 
location of troops.  On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be 
enforced against obscene publications.  The security of the community life may be 
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly 
government.  The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not “protect a man from an 
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. . . .” 
Id. at 716; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 112. See Redish, supra note 14, at 88; see also Lemley & Volokh supra note 102, at 177. 
 113. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 102, at 177-78.  
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conform to the Court’s standard for administrative licensing schemes114 
announced in Freedman v. Maryland.
115
  In that case, a Maryland law 
required movie theaters to submit films to the state Board of Censors 
before public screening.
116
  The Court struck down the law because it 
failed to comply with “procedural safeguards designed to obviate the 
dangers of a censorship system.”117  To pass constitutional muster, the 
Court held that any licensing scheme must allow for prompt judicial 
review and, once in court, the burden had to rest with the government.
118
 
Fundamentally, the Court sets an extremely high bar when any 
government entity, including the judiciary, seeks to prevent potentially 
protected speech from being uttered.  The question is whether history 
and the Court’s current approach counsels in favor of applying this high 
threshold in other First Amendment contexts. 
B. Historical and Doctrinal Analogies between Freedom of Speech 
and Freedom of Religion 
1. The Historical Debates 
Professor Douglas Laycock justifies strong church-state separation 
in part by appealing to history.
119
  The States ratified the Religion 
Clauses against a backdrop of substantial governmental oppression.
120
  
The Framers witnessed regimes suppress minority religions, which 
“caused vast human suffering.”121  According to Laycock, James 
Madison proposed that the First Amendment should ban all 
governmental infringement upon religious liberty.
122
  Because 
individuals value religion much more than civil government, the proper 
solution is to separate “the coercive power of government from all 
questions of religion, so that no religion can invoke the government’s 
coercive power and no government can coerce any religious act or 
belief.”123  The state must be strictly neutral towards religion because 
intervention distorts religious development, leads to discrimination, and 
 
 114. Id. at 179. 
 115. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 116. Id. at 52. 
 117. Id. at 58. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 
(1996). 
 120. Id. at 317. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 319. 
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increases competition among religions for substantial government 
resources.
124
  For reasons partially rooted in the debates surrounding 
ratification, Laycock takes the position that the government should be 
neutral towards religion not only when government acts coercively, but 
even when government does not exercise its coercive power.
125
 
Philip Hamburger takes a different view.
126
  Thomas Jefferson’s 
approach, a forcefully separationist attitude that individuals should be 
“free from religion” because it stifles free thought, predominates the 
Court’s jurisprudence.127  But far from being the dominant position at 
the time of ratification, Hamburger argues that the doctrine of separation 
of church and state reflected post-ratification bigotry.
128
  Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s approach may also explain the Religion Clauses.  De 
Tocqueville believed religion supplied baseline human rights that could 
not shift at the whim of majority factions.
129
  Religion “could reduce the 
necessity of civil coercion . . . [and] also establish a lasting foundation in 
public opinion for the various rights that seemed particularly vulnerable 
to fluctuations in popular sentiments.”130  The goal is not to seal off 
religion from the state.  Rather, religion is a legitimate object of 
government attention.
131
  This interpretation, Hamburger argues, is most 
consistent with the history surrounding the ratification of the Religion 
Clauses.
132
 
Professors Laycock and Hamburger enter into an interesting 
historical and philosophical dialogue and the argument helps answer the 
question whether judges should entangle themselves with religion.  On 
the one hand, Laycock suggests government involvement in religion will 
 
 124. Id. at 320-21. 
 125. Id. at 323. 
 126. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 483-86 (Harv. Univ. Pr. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 485-86. 
 128.  
In the election 1800, Republicans used the idea of separation to limit the speech of 
clergymen in political matters.  Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Protestants 
repeatedly relied on the concept to deny Catholics equal rights in publicly funded 
schools and to discourage Catholic political activity.  In the 1870s, the National Liberal 
League attempted to use the idea of separation of church and state to limit the political 
participation of religious groups and to challenge otherwise secular laws that benefited 
these groups, that were influenced by them, or that coincided with their distinctive moral 
obligations. 
Id. at 483-84. 
 129. Id. at 485. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
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lead to religious conflict and the emergence of a dominant religion.
133
  
Jefferson goes further:  government should not be involved in promoting 
religion because “most churches undermined the inclination and ability 
of individuals to think for themselves.”134  Laycock’s view suggests 
government should be concerned about religion and that religion should 
be concerned about government.  On the other hand, Hamburger argues 
that the original understanding of the Establishment Clause made room 
for government involvement in religion because it was a source of 
human rights that should be cultivated.
135
  In contrast to Laycock, 
Hamburger’s approach suggests neither government nor religion should 
worry about close contact with each other. 
But what does this say about the historical relationship between 
religion and speech?  Professor David A.J. Richards surveyed the 
historical work of Leonard Levy and his analysis of James Madison’s 
“striking interpretive analogy” of the Free Speech Clause to the Religion 
Clauses.
136
  The predominant historical understanding is that the 
Religion Clauses serve different ends than the Free Speech Clause.
137
  
To be sure, this view is plausible.  Federalists argued that textual 
differences between the clauses meant Congress had the power to 
regulate seditious libel.
138
  The Free Speech Clause says Congress shall 
make no law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”139  The 
Religion Clauses, though, say simply that Congress shall make no law 
“respecting an establishment of religion.”140 Federalists claimed “that the 
difference in language justified the interpretive inference that Congress, 
unlike the religion clauses, could make laws respecting but not abridging 
speech; that is, Congress could regulate speech through laws like 
seditious libel laws.”141  Madison, who was committed to the 
Jeffersonian vision of freedom of religion, rejected this argument.
142
  He 
drew a clear line: the state has no power to regulate religion.
143
 
 
 133. See Laycock, supra note 119, at 320-21. 
 134. HAMBURGER, supra note 126, at 485. 
 135. Id.  
 136. David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1837, 1872 (1987). 
 137. Id. at 1871 (“Historians of the first amendment typically contrast the original highly 
libertarian understanding of the religion clauses with the extremely circumscribed understanding of 
the free speech and press clauses.”). 
 138. Id. at 1872. 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Richards, supra note 136, at 1872. 
 142. Id. at 1878-79.  Essentially, Madison and Jefferson believed civil government had no 
power to use its coercive powers to advance or inhibit religion. 
Madison shares with Jefferson this principled understanding of the meaning of religious 
1- REILLY_MACRO.DOCM 3/23/2012  10:48 AM 
18 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [3:1 
But according to Richards, Madison went further than Jefferson and 
linked freedom of conscience with freedom of speech.
144
  Madison’s 
argument has been described as follows: 
[t]he state may have no power over religion because enforceable state 
judgments about the worth or value of religion are corrupted by 
society’s illegitimately sectarian beliefs about the true religion, which 
degrades the reasonable moral independence essential to a community 
of free people.  Madison saw that the same argument justified a 
comparable protection for communicative independence because the 
state was familiarly inclined to make and enforce the same kinds of 
suspect judgments about the worth of speech and thus to compromise 
the communicative foundations of moral independence and of 
conscience itself.  The principle of free speech was accordingly 
directed at a comparable prohibition on the enforcement of these types 
of state judgments.
145
 
In other words, Madison treats the two clauses with equal respect 
because both are necessary as a bulwark against the state’s coercive 
power.  If the government begins to involve itself in advancing or 
inhibiting religion, distortion or suppression of minority religions and 
individual liberties is not far behind.  For Madison, the same is true 
when government involves itself in promoting or suppressing speech. 
These views inform the Supreme Court’s current debate regarding 
the Religion Clauses and how the Justices may answer the question 
whether district courts should enjoin or entangle themselves in religious 
practice.  Further, Madison’s willingness to link the constitutional 
importance of speech with religion provides historical support for the 
proposition that courts should be extremely wary of issuing injunctions 
like the one in Uniao do Vegetal. 
 
liberty.  Madison’s advocacy in Virginia of Jefferson’s Bill coupled with his clearly 
stated dependence on the Virginian understanding behind the adoption of the religion 
clauses of the first amendment confirm the place of these principles in the original 
understanding of the religion clauses. 
Id.  
 143. Id. at 1879. 
 144. Richards, supra note 136, at 1875, 1879 (“Madison’s argument is not only that the 
principles of religious liberty and free speech are analogous but also that they rest ‘equally on the 
original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution’ and are ‘equally and completely 
exempted from all authority whatever of the United States.’”).  
 145. Id. at 1879. 
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2. The Supreme Court’s Current Debate 
A relatively unexplored area of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
is the interplay between the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause, particularly when it comes to “government speech.”146  By 
examining two cases implicating both clauses—Rosenberger v. 
University of Virginia
147
 and Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School
148—two distinct attitudes towards freedom of religion emerge, 
and seem to closely track the contrasting views of Professors Laycock 
and Hamburger. 
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia implemented a system 
that used student fees to pay printing costs for various student groups 
and publications.
149
  However, the University withheld payments for 
publications promoting beliefs “about a deity or an ultimate reality.”150  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court held that the University created 
a “metaphysical” limited public forum.151  Excluding religious 
publications discriminated based on viewpoint, and therefore the 
University’s policy was unconstitutional.152  Granting student groups 
access to school facilities “on a religion-neutral basis” does not cause an 
Establishment problem.
153
  Justice Kennedy also distinguished the 
student fees used to pay the printing costs, which did not conflict with 
the Establishment Clause, from a tax that directly supported a religion, 
which did.
154
  None of the funds went directly to the student groups.
155
  
 
 146. Harvard Law Review Association, Government Speech, 123 HARV. L. REV. 232, 232 
(2009).  A full discussion regarding the limited public forum doctrine and the strict scrutiny 
required when the court finds “viewpoint discrimination” is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Essentially, the government can create a “limited public forum” by opening facilities or space to 
expressive activity (such as public library meeting rooms).  16A AM. JUR. 2D CONST. LAW § 542 
(2001).  Once the government does so, it is not required to open the forum to all types of speech.  
Id.  Restrictions must only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  Id.  Viewpoint discrimination is a 
particularly disfavored subset of content discrimination, and occurs when the government licenses 
“one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury 
rules.”  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).  For example, the government may not 
prohibit fighting words motivated by hatred if it does not also prohibit the same type of speech 
motivated by motives the government deems “good.”  See id. 
 147. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 148. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 149. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23. 
 150. Id. at 823. 
 151. Id. at 830. 
 152. Id. at 831 (“By the very terms of the . . . prohibition, the University does not exclude 
religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts 
with religious editorial viewpoints.”). 
 153. Id. at 842. 
 154. Id. at 840. 
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Rather, the University paid a contractor to print student publications on a 
neutral basis.
156
  If the contrary view became law, “it would require the 
University, in order to avoid a constitutional violation, to scrutinize the 
content of student speech, lest the expression in question—speech 
otherwise protected by the Constitution—contain too great a religious 
content.”157  Justice Kennedy said this approach would cause much 
greater problems under the Establishment Clause than paying for 
printing costs on a neutral basis.
158
 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg, 
dissented.  Justice Souter found no viewpoint discrimination because the 
University’s policy barred payment for both atheistic and theistic 
publications.
159
  More importantly, the dissent was disturbed that the 
University would be required to directly subsidize a student publication 
with a mission “to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, 
according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to 
consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.”160  The 
publication was not simply a “descriptive examination” of Christian 
doctrine.
161
  Rather, it announced an evangelical call to the Christian 
faith.
162
  Therefore, the University was using public funds to directly 
subsidize “preaching the word,” which the Establishment Clause 
categorically bars.
163
  For historical support, Justice Souter cited 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments.
164
  In 1785, the Virginia legislature was slated to renew a 
tax levy that supported ministers of the Anglican Church.
165
  Both 
Jefferson and Madison led the charge against the tax assessment and, in 
response to Madison’s Remonstrance, the Virginia General Assembly 
killed the bill in committee.
166
  Instead, the legislature enacted 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 843. 
 157. Id. at 844. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 865. 
 161. Id. at 867. 
 162. Id. at 868. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  Madison wrote, “Who does not see that . . . the same authority which can force a 
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”  Madison was responding 
to a proposed Virginia tax assessment bill that would be used to support religious entities. 
 165. Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, and the Establishment Clause: A Proposal for 
Reform, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 683, 725 (2008). 
 166. Id. at 725-26. 
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Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Freedom.167  The dissent read Madison’s 
Remonstrance to stand for the proposition that, originally understood, 
the Establishment Clause was designed not only to prevent government 
from preferring one religious denomination over another, but from 
preferring religion over non-religion.
168
 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence criticized the dissent’s reading of the 
Remonstrance.  Madison did not object to the Virginia bill because he 
thought “that religious entities may never participate on equal terms in 
neutral government programs.”169  Rather, the bill offended Madison 
because it singled out some churches for benefits while burdening 
others.
170
  Justice Thomas noted scholarly disagreement over the 
Virginia Assessment Controversy,
171
 and opted for the view that the 
“Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on 
government preferences for some religious faiths over others . . . .”172 
In Good News Club, a school policy allowed district residents to 
use a school building after hours for educational purposes or “social, 
civic and recreation meetings and entertainment events, and other uses 
pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall 
be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public.”173  The 
school denied a Christian organization’s request to host after-school 
religious activities because the policy prohibited use “for religious 
purposes.”174  The Good News Club sued, alleging the school’s denial 
violated its free speech and religious exercise rights.
175
 
Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court found clear-cut viewpoint 
discrimination because the school barred religious activities from a 
limited public forum.
176
  The school argued that even if it did 
 
 167. Id. at 726. 
 168.  
The principle against direct funding with public money is patently violated by the 
contested use of today’s student activity fee. Like today’s taxes generally, the fee is 
Madison’s three pence.  The University exercises the power of the State to compel a 
student to pay it . . . and the use of any part of it for the direct support of religious 
activity thus strikes at what we have repeatedly held to be the heart of the prohibition on 
establishment. 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 873-74. 
 169. Id. at 854 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 170. Id. at 855. 
 171. Id. (“Legal commentators have disagreed about the historical lesson to take from the 
Assessment Controversy.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). 
 174. Id. at 103. 
 175. Id. at 104. 
 176. Id. at 107. 
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discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, its policy survived strict scrutiny 
because of the compelling interest in not violating the Establishment 
Clause.
177
  The Court found that “the school has no valid Establishment 
Clause interest.”178  First, the Good News Club sought access to the 
forum only on the same terms as secular groups.
179
  Reasonable parents 
(and even reasonable children) would not believe the school endorsed 
religion simply by allowing a religious organization access to the 
building after school.
180
  
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
181
  Justice 
Stevens was willing to distinguish religious viewpoint from religious 
proselytizing.
182
  The school’s concern that religious clubs would aim to 
“recruit” or coerce children to join their particular religion was 
reasonable.
183
  In other words, the school did not exclude all religious 
viewpoints, only proselytizing.
184
  In a concurrence, Justice Scalia 
responded by arguing that any “peer pressure” or “coercion” was merely 
a byproduct of free association.
185
  “What is at play here is not 
coercion,” Scalia wrote, “but the compulsion of ideas—and the private 
right to exert and receive that compulsion . . . is protected by the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, not banned by the Establishment 
Clause.”186 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with Justice 
Stevens’ distinction between religious description and religious 
proselytizing.
187
  On the Establishment Clause question, Justice Souter 
 
 177. Id. at 112. 
 178. Id. at 113. 
 179. Id. at 115. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at 101. 
 182. Id. at 131 (“Distinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the one hand, from 
religious proselytizing, on the other, is comparable to distinguishing meetings to discuss political 
issues from meetings whose principal purpose is to recruit new members to join a political 
organization.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 132. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 186. Id. 
 187.  
It is beyond question that Good News intends to use the public school premises not for 
the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view, but for an 
evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of 
Christian conversion.  The majority avoids this reality only by resorting to the bland and 
general characterization of Good News’s activity as ‘teaching of morals and character, 
from a religious standpoint.’ . . . Otherwise, indeed, this case would stand for the 
remarkable proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened 
for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque. 
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would require courts to undertake a detailed factual inquiry designed to 
ensure that Good News did not “dominate the forum in a way that 
heightens the perception of official endorsement.”188  Because of this 
concern that, in practice, the school would actively endorse the club’s 
religious mission, further fact-finding on matters such as the timing of 
Good News’ meetings and which other groups met at the school was 
necessary to ensure that school activities did not bleed over into 
religious ones.
189
 
The dialogue between the majority and dissents illustrates the 
prevailing views on the Court regarding “religious” speech and its 
relationship to the Establishment Clause.  The dissenting Justices 
bifurcate religious speech into a simple explanation and discussion of 
church doctrines, on the one hand, and proselytizing, on the other.  
Under this view, the government may subsidize or grant access to groups 
that engage in the former type of religious speech, but never the latter.  
The dissenting Justices draw a bright line: whenever religious groups 
“preach the word,” the government may not directly subsidize that 
group.
190
  Fairly read, this view reflects Laycock’s concern that the 
government must not involve itself in religious affairs because it may 
distort both religious and secular thought. 
The Justices in the majority are unwilling to bifurcate religious 
speech and see no plausible reason to treat religious speech aiming to 
“preach” different from other types of religious speech.  In fact, the 
Constitution tolerates “coercion” resulting from the government granting 
access to religious groups because of free association and free exercise 
principles.
191
  Further, the majority’s position regarding the 
Establishment Clause meshes with Hamburger’s historical view of 
religion.  Like de Tocqueville, the conservative Justices are more 
comfortable with government involvement in subsidizing or granting 
access to religious groups because religion creates “public goods” and 
may help explain where human rights come from.  This view correlates 
with Hamburger’s view that government need not seal itself off from 
religion, particularly because religion can offer something positive to the 
marketplace of ideas and provide a basis for important rights that the 
government should address.
192
 
 
Id. at 138-39 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 188. Id. at 144-45. 
 189. Id. at 144. 
 190. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 191. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192. See HAMBURGER, supra note 126, at 485. 
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IV.  DISENTANGLING COURTS FROM RELIGION 
This Part attempts to connect the principles of the prior restraint 
doctrine under the Free Speech Clause with the Establishment Clause.  
More specifically, this Part argues that debates at the time of ratification, 
more recent Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations 
conceptually link the two Clauses.  This Part then proposes that, just as 
courts are reluctant to enjoin speech prior to determining whether that 
speech is protected, courts should be wary of enjoining religious activity 
prior to determining whether those activities warrant First Amendment 
protection. To do so, courts should import the Free Speech Clause’s 
prior restraint doctrine to analyze Religion Clause cases. 
A. Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Religious Practice Distinct 
From Those Against Free Speech? 
Two interrelated propositions justify treating restraints on religious 
practice similar to restraints against speech.  First, the separationist view 
reflected in scholarship and in recent Supreme Court decisions is the 
correct legal policy.  Second, historical support links the two clauses and 
counsels against government regulation of both speech and religion. 
The first step is to answer the question whether, in light of 
underlying policies behind the Free Speech Clause and the 
Establishment Clause, pretrial injunctions against speech are analogous 
to pretrial injunctions implicating religious activities.  The most obvious 
distinction is that the affected religious group remains free to practice its 
religion.  Under the preliminary injunction issued in Uniao do Vegetal, 
group members could use hoasca for sacramental purposes.
193
  The 
primary concern in free speech cases, however, is that enjoining speech 
will restrict potentially protected expression.
194
  
Closer examination reveals this distinction is superficial.  For 
example, consider a hypothetical case where an anonymous member of a 
group seeks to distribute handbills on a public street.  The government 
claims the materials are obscene and sues to enjoin its distribution.  The 
court first finds that the government is unlikely to prove the material is 
obscene, and further finds that an injunction in the government’s favor 
would amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint.  Therefore, the judge 
does not grant the government’s injunction, and allows the handbill to be 
distributed.  But the judge imposes several conditions on the speaker: 
 
 193. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427 (2006). 
 194. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 102, at 171. 
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she must submit the names and Social Security numbers of all who 
played a role in crafting the handbill and must allow the government to 
inspect the document within a reasonable time prior to distribution.  
Quite likely, the Court would strike this injunction down as a prior 
restraint even though it permits the group to distribute its handbill.  The 
arrangement does not conform to the Freedman standard for 
administrative licensing schemes.
195
  It also flaunts the policy purposes 
behind the doctrine, which reflect concerns that prior restraints “(1) 
hav[e] a greater chilling effect on potential speech; (2) subject[] a wider 
spectrum of speech to official scrutiny; (3) suppress[] speech at 
significantly less cost; and (4) encourag[e] greater speech suppression 
than laws in the form of subsequent sanctions.”196  Further, the 
injunction fails to accommodate “anonymous” speech, which is 
generally protected under the First Amendment.
197
  
Therefore, this hypothetical injunction is a prior restraint against 
speech and it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the Uniao do 
Vegetal injunction because the policy justifications for separation of 
church and state are similar to those counseling in favor of applying the 
prior restraint doctrine.  In addition to a historical basis for separation,
198
 
Laycock argues that because “religion is far more important to 
individuals than to the government,” the state should “leav[e] religion 
entirely to individuals and their voluntary groups.”199  Further, “[t]he 
religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it 
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or 
non-practice, observance or nonobservance.”200  In other words, 
government should not discourage or involve itself in religious affairs 
because, among other reasons, government influence may distort 
religious beliefs and lead to discrimination by a dominant religion.
201
  
The policies in the background of Justice Souter’s Rosenberger 
dissent are analogous.  The Establishment Clause means the state must 
never directly subsidize religious groups when that money is being used 
 
 195. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 196. Martin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctine of Prior 
Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
 197. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (stating that “[a]nonymous 
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of 
mankind.”). 
 198. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 199. Laycock, supra note 119, at 319. 
 200. Id. at 320. 
 201. Id. at 320-21. 
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to proselytize, according to Justice Souter.
202
  This constitutes a 
governmental preference of religion over non-religion, and is 
unconstitutional because the government compels students to pay the fee 
and forces those same students to support a religious message that may 
not coincide with their conscience.
203
  
Similar concerns drive the Court’s free speech jurisprudence.  The 
government generally should not restrain speech because it distorts 
“dominant” speakers and may amplify the government’s preferred 
message.
204
  To serve this end, courts do not enjoin speech because it 
requires increased government oversight.
205
 
Both clauses reflect concerns that government restrictions on 
speech and religion may lead to distortions and discrimination among 
speakers and religious groups.  In the speech context, courts handle this 
reality by refusing to enjoin expression before determining whether the 
speech at issue is protected.  In the religious context, as Uniao do 
Vegetal shows, courts are more comfortable giving government 
substantial oversight of religious groups, even if that may amount to 
unconstitutional entanglement.
206
  In the face of such searching 
government involvement in UDV’s religious affairs, though, the danger 
that UDV members may leave the religion or stop fully practicing their 
religion while the injunction is in force and perhaps beyond is a real 
concern.  This is true even though the Uniao do Vegetal judge 
determined the UDV had a substantial likelihood of proving their 
religious practice was protected.
207
  Just as courts should be wary of 
restraining free speech, they should be careful when considering whether 
to restrain religious activity by injunction because the policies 
underpinning both free speech and free religion are linked. 
Beyond policy considerations, Madison provides a historical 
justification for treating the two clauses similarly.  First, at least some on 
 
 202. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 203. See id. at 873-74. 
 204.  
Government censorship distorts the marketplace of ideas by not making all viewpoints 
available.  For example, to the extent that ‘Pro-Choice’ or ‘U.S. Out of Iraq’ license 
plates are absent, speakers are denied the opportunity for self-expression, and readers are 
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Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 605, 667 (2008). 
 205. Scordato, supra note 196, at 3. 
 206. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 207. O Centra Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1269 
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the current court believe Madison’s Remonstrance serves as evidence 
that the Establishment Clause reflected a concern that church and state 
should be separated.
208
  More importantly, Madison argued that 
“religious liberty and free speech are analogous,” and neither are proper 
subjects of government regulation.
209
  The danger of government 
involvement with religion is that the state cannot legitimately evaluate 
“the worth or value of religion.”210  The state is similarly incompetent to 
judge which speech is worthy of expression.  Therefore, the Free Speech 
Clause prevents government from restricting speech just as much as the 
Establishment Clause prevents the government from restricting religious 
activity.
211
  If Madison is correct,
212
 the prior restraint doctrine is 
relevant in Establishment Clause cases.  Courts almost always refuse to 
enjoin speech before a full determination on the merits, in part because 
of Madison’s concern that the government is incapable of properly 
valuing speech.
213
  Similar concerns caution against injunctions that 
restrict religious activity not yet determined to be within the 
government’s regulatory power. 
 
 208. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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B. Applying Prior Restraint Principles in Religion Clause Cases:  A 
Solution to the Entanglement Problems Raised by Injunctions 
Against Religious Practice 
Two plausible connections link the Free Speech Clause and the 
Religion Clauses.  First, preliminary injunctions requiring religious 
groups to submit to substantial government surveillance amount to 
unconstitutional entanglement.
214
  With that in mind, Madison links the 
concepts of free conscience and free speech.
215
  Whether these 
connections justify importing, in some form, the Free Speech Clause’s 
prior restraint doctrine into the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence depends on whether Laycock, and the Justices who track 
his separationist position, or Hamburger, and the Justices who follow his 
position, are more persuasive.
216
  
This Article argues the former view is persuasive, and justifies prior 
restraint-style analysis when courts consider Religion Clause cases.  
Madison’s argument that the two clauses advance the same fundamental 
purposes is correct.
217
  Legislatures, no more than courts, are 
incompetent to evaluate the worthiness of political expression and of 
individual’s deeply personal religious beliefs.218  Once government 
involves itself in making these determinations about beliefs, distortion 
becomes a true danger.
219
  Whether courts issue traditional preliminary 
injunctions that completely bar contested religious practice or ones 
giving the government substantial regulatory power over religious 
groups, courts should keep these principles in mind when deciding 
whether to restrict religious practice before fully deciding the practice is 
not protected. 
In light of these connections, the status quo in cases involving 
religious activity should not be government regulation.  Rather, the 
status quo should be nonestablishment.  In Uniao do Vegetal, for 
example, both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit should have viewed 
UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca as the status quo.  Because the UDV 
showed a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the proper 
 
 214. See supra Part II.B.2-3. 
 215. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 216. See id. 
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course under this proposed analysis would be to leave the UDV free to 
practice its religion, unencumbered by government oversight.  Any other 
result risks restraining free religious practice before the trial court 
determines the religious exercise falls outside First Amendment 
protection.  Even if the status quo remains in favor of government 
enforcement, the prior restraint doctrine should still apply.
220
 
This approach gives greater deference to religious groups’ free 
exercise and better accommodates concerns that government 
involvement should be extremely limited when it comes to religious 
affairs.  A prior restraint-style rule forces judges to consider the full 
impact of enjoining religious practice or subjecting the religious group to 
government regulation.  In Uniao do Vegetal, both the district judge and 
the Tenth Circuit overlooked potential Establishment Clause issues in 
their determinations.  A prior restraint inquiry would have brought these 
concerns to the forefront and resulted in decisions respecting historical 
and theoretical concerns that government should be separate from 
religion. 
However, just as in prior restraint cases against speech, religious 
activity is not unlimited.
221
  Legal scholarship suggests two possible 
ways the government may overcome the presumption against prior 
restraints of speech.  First, a court may possibly enjoin speech if the 
government shows “a strong likelihood” that the speech does not warrant 
First Amendment protection.
222
  Second, a court may enjoin speech if the 
injunction complies with the Freedman factors for administrative 
licensing schemes.
223
  If courts choose to import the prior restraint 
doctrine to religious inquiries, these exceptions should also apply.  For 
example, if the government in Uniao do Vegetal made an extraordinary 
showing that hoasca is dangerous and a substantial illicit market existed, 
the trial court may have been justified in conditioning an injunction on 
government oversight.  Or perhaps, under reasoning similar to 
Freedman, the judge could have enjoined the religious practice 
temporarily but expedited review to determine whether UDV’s religious 
practice was protected.  
 
 220. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 102, at 171-72 (noting that a preliminary injunction that 
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While the precise scope of any exceptions is unclear, the 
fundamental point is that both historical and philosophical concerns with 
separation of church and state justify judicial reticence to impose 
injunctions that may restrain potentially protected religious activity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The UDV sincerely believes drinking hoasca tea is a way to 
commune with Jesus Christ, and the practice is central to their faith.
224
  
While the trial court found that the government failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in substantially burdening the UDV’s religious 
exercise, the judge allowed federal officials to exercise substantial 
regulatory oversight of UDV members and their solemn religious 
ceremonies.
225
  Under the Supreme Court’s Lemon test, such oversight 
likely results in unconstitutional entanglement.  
To say it differently, the preliminary injunction restrained the 
UDV’s religious practice.  It did so before a full determination that using 
hoasca fell outside First Amendment protection.  If speech was at issue, 
a judge would refuse to enjoin the expression under the Court’s prior 
restraint doctrine.
226
  Any conditions that permitted the government 
oversight of the potentially protected speech would likely conflict with 
First Amendment principles.  But founding-era authorities suggest the 
Free Speech and Religion Clauses are intimately related because both 
operate to bar the government from making moral judgments about the 
value of expression and individual beliefs.
227
  A line of thought in both 
recent legal scholarship and Supreme Court cases is also concerned that 
government endorsement or disapproval of religious affairs may have a 
corroding effect and lead to discrimination.
228
  These conceptual 
connections justify treating religion and speech similarly.  Courts should 
greet government requests to enjoin or otherwise restrict religious 
practice with the same heavy skepticism as preliminary injunctions 
against speech. 
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